In the preceeding Memoir it was asserted on the Authority of Reason, of authentic private information, and of the concurrent opinion of Men of all partys in England, that the War carrying on against the United Colonys, would terminate with the present Year; That should Britain fail of reducing them to Her dominion, She would dispair of ever doing it, and would try by an Alliance with them to recover as much as might be possible of their Commerce and Friendship. Strong reasons and good information likewise, engaged us to Conclude, that when Britain should make peace with the Colonys, She would immediately after make war against France. The opponents of the British Ministry now desire it, and the Ministry themselves will soon find it necessary for their own preservation. The people of England were allured into the War by a promise that the Colonys should be quickly reduced, and that a Considerable revenue should be obtained from them. The first part of this promise has failed, and so must the other; for if the Colonys be not overcome, they will grant no revenue, and if they should be subdued, they must for a long time be too much exhausted to pay any. This the British Ministry well know, but as often as they have appeared sensible of the unpleasing Truth, and willing to relinquish the Idea of an American revenue, the House of Commons, and particularly the Landed Interest in it, have taken the alarm and threatened a general revolt. Much disappointment, and much resentment will therefore arise in the British nation when it shall be known fully that they have been deceived by their Ministers, and that no revenue nor any other benefit is to be expected in return for the Blood and Treasure, wantonly spent in the present War. The Ministry therefore to divert the publick Vengeance from themselves, must contrive other Channels for it, and ascribe their want of success to the secret Encouragement and assistance said to have been given the Colonys by France, which they will proclaim and Magnify as well to excuse their own failures, as to direct the resentment of the people against this Nation. A disposition in them to pursue this Course, has already been Manifested by several proceedings and publications; and in Consequence thereof that animosity against the French, of which the English are readily susceptible, has lately appeared on several occasions; and the excitement of it by the British Government, is a more unequivocal preparation for War, than their encreasing Naval Armaments, or the twenty aditional Regiments which it is understood, they are now about to raise in G Britain and Ireland. Whenever Britain shall begin another war, she will doubtless begin it as She did the last, with some unexpected and severe Act of Hostillity, sufficient to Insure her final Success, and to disable Her Adversary: for such a Mode of proceeding Her present Situation is well adapted. Her German Auxillaries are not only engaged, but transported to America: Her Land and Sea force already Collected there, is in the highest degree formidable; and should it fail of Success in this Campaign, will the British Ministry Accellerate their own ruin, by disgracefully recalling it to Europe? Will they not rather direct their Commissioners to make the best possible peace they can with the Colonys, and with this mighty force to fall suddenly upon the French and Spanish West Indian possessions, a great part of which might be Conquered, before even the Attempt could be known here? Such a proceeding would enable the British Ministry to provide for their safety and continuance in office, as well as to gratify their National avarice, and resentment: And a successful commencement of the War in this way would prevent any considerable fall in the English Funds, and probably enable Britain to prosecute the War with Vigor; and for beginning it in this manner she would want no other pretext, than the secret assistance which France is supposed to have given the United Colonys. It has been objected that the Finances of France, are too much disordered to admit of a War with England. But whatever degree of Truth there may be in this Objection, the Fact will not retard the operation of those Causes which are likely to induce the British Ministry to begin a War; on the contrary it will rather encourage them to do it. Neither the derangement of the Finances, whatever it might be, nor the probability of an attack from England will be lessend from our insensibillity and negligence. Difficultys and Dangers really existing should be encountered speedily and boldly. Obsta Principiis is a wise maxim. Lasting future peace, can now be expected only from an immediate War. If Britain be now attacked, while the great part of her force is employed by the Colonys, She may soon be effectually disabled from giving future disturbance to Europe. The bare declaration of War against her by France, at this time, would make her total loss of the Colonys evident to all the world, and would Consequently disable her from borrowing the most inconsiderable Sums. Necessity would therefore compel her to an immediate Submission; the War would therefore not only be short but unexpensive. Employed as Great Britain already is with the Colonys, no greater efforts would be requisite from France, than such as she may now make by a vigorous use of Her Military and Naval Force. Any Mony which could be reasonably wanted, might be now obtained before the commencement of Hostillities; whereas if England be permitted to make Peace with America first, and afterwards to attack France, much larger Sums will be requisite, and the borrowing of them may then become impracticable. Gr Britain seems to have no Ally, from which she could expect any considerable Aid, were she now attack’d. Even Russia would probably remain inactive, especially as she is too remote to injure France or Spain, and is besides likely to have otherwise sufficient employment at Home. A War with England would at this time Necessarily prove both short and successfull: and it seems to be the only oeconomical plan of a wise and certain expedient for the preventing the Waste of Blood and Treasure, which must be occasioned by a long and doubtfull War, when England shall have made Peace with the Colonys. Her present Contest with America, seems to have been providentially dessigned for the Elevation and Glory of France. Heaven in the Government of Human Affairs, has rarely given a Nation so fortunate an opportunity of agrandizing herself and of humbling her Adversary, and will never give it a second time: The Prize is offered to us who live at this aera, and should we loose it, Posterity at least will lament and reproach our folly and negligence. But it is objected We have no just cause for making War upon England. Mankind are, however, so very reasonable, that they never long want reasons for any thing which they may wish to do. Nations are always able to contrive specious pretexts for Wars begun for Interested or worse Motives, but the fallacy of this Practice is so well understood, that but few regard the reasons assigned by States for their Conduct, or enquire whether it be Consonant to the strict rules of Moral right. If a War be undertaken from good Policy, and prosecuted with Success, it is always applauded as Just and glorious. The Nations who Allied themselves against Louis the 14. neither had, nor pretended to have sustained any Injury from him; they professed only to dread his growing Power; a similar apprehension, would justify a similar alliance for seperating the Colonys from G Britain, and laying that Trade open, which She would alone monopolize. But after the Unjustifiable manner, in which England began the last War, She can never want a good Cause for renewing it; the Unwarrantable seizure of our Ships and Seamen which in a great degree ruined our Navy and disabled us from afterwards defending our possessions, will in future time not only give us a right, but make it our duty to attempt to recover them, whenever it may be practicable as it is at present. But should it not seem adviseable to plead former injuries, more recent ostensible causes for War may be easily obtained. The arrogance of the Brittish Naval officers and Seamen, has already in different places, begun to shew itself by Acts of Violence, which with a little justifiable retaliation on our parts, would be Multiplied and exagerated on theirs, so as to give abundant provocation for a War. But if after all the Government of France should chuse to depend on Accident for safety, rather than secure it, by a Short and successfull War, the wisest plan of Conduct will be to engage some of the powers of Europe to recognize the Independancy of the Colonys; Perhaps the Emperor, the King of Prussia, with the Grand Duke of Tuscany, might be induced to Concur with France, in making such a recognition. Were it However made by but a few of these Powers, they would be too many for G Britain to Quarrel with together, and if made in the same Manner and the same time by them, their offence would be so far equal, that She could have no pretence for resenting it against any one of them seperately. Such a recognition would encourage the Colonys so as that they would reject every offer of accommodation with G Britain. All Europe would moreover see by it, that She had for ever lost Her Trade and possessions in America, and Consequently that She must hereafter be unable to pay even the Interest of her Publick debt. It would therefore destroy her Credit and disable her from not only beginning a War in Europe, but from prosecuting that which She is prosecuting in America. This recognition would therefore be attended with no danger [to] the powers which should concur in it, but on the contrary it must Contribute to their security; and as it would Cost nothing but words, the Colonys might certainly expect so much Countenance and aid from those who will profitt so highly [by] their seperation from England. But should it be otherwise determined, and should G Britain be thereby left to become the first State which acknowledges the Independency of the Colonys, they may think lightly of their obligations to other Powers and may again admit her to a greater share of their Commerce and Friendship, than will consist with the Prosperity or safety of France and Spain.