Mr. Franklin,
A. A.
Socrates. Who is that well-dress’d Man
that passed by just now?
Crito. He is a Gentleman of this City,
esteem’d a Man of Sense, but not very honest.
S. The Appellation of a Man of
Sense is of late frequently given, and seems to come naturally
into the Character of every Man we are about to praise: But I am at
some Loss to know whether a Man who is not honest can
deserve it.
C. Yes, doubtless; There are many
vicious Men who are nevertheless Men of very good Sense.
S. You are of Opinion, perhaps, that a
Man of Knowledge is a Man of Sense.
C. I am really of that Opinion.
S. Is the Knowledge of Push-pin, or of
the Game at Ninepins, or of Cards and Dice, or even of Musick and
Dancing, sufficient to constitute the Character of a Man of
Sense?
C. No certainly; there are many silly
People that understand these Things tolerably well.
S. Will the Knowledge of Languages, or
of Logic and Rhetoric serve to make a Man of Sense?
C. I think not; for I have known very
senseless Fellows to be Masters of two or three Languages; and
mighty full of their Logic, or their Rhetoric.
S. Perhaps some Men may understand all
the Forms and Terms of Logic, or all the Figures of Rhetoric, and
yet be no more able to convince or to perswade, than others who
have not learnt those Things?
C. Indeed I believe they may.
S. Will not the Knowledge of the
Mathematicks, Astronomy, and Natural Philosophy, those sublime
Sciences, give a Right to the Character of a Man of
Sense?
C. At first Sight I should have thought
they might: But upon Recollection I must own I have known some Men,
Masters of those Sciences, who, in the Management of their Affairs,
and Conduct of their Lives, have acted very weakly, I
do not mean viciously but foolishly; and therefore I cannot find in
my Heart to allow ’em the Character of Men of Sense.
S. It seems then, that no Knowledge will
serve to give this Character, but the Knowledge of our true
Interest; that is, of what is best to be done in all the
Circumstances of Humane Life, in order to arrive at our main End in
View, Happiness.
C. I am of the same Opinion. And now, as
to the Point in Hand, I suppose you will no longer doubt whether a
vicious Man may deserve the Character of a Man of Sense, since ’tis
certain that there are many Men who know their true
Interest, &c. and are therefore Men of Sense, but are
nevertheless vicious and dishonest Men, as appears from the whole
Tenour of their Conduct in Life.
S. Can Vice consist with any Man’s true
Interest, or contribute to his Happiness?
C. No certainly; for in Proportion as a
Man is vicious he loses the Favour of God and Man, and brings upon
himself many Inconveniences, the least of which is capable of
marring and demolishing his Happiness.
S. How then does it appear that those
vicious Men have the Knowledge we have been speaking of, which
constitutes a Man of Sense, since they act directly
contrary?
C. It appears by their Discoursing
perfectly well upon the Subjects of Vice and Virtue, when they
occur in Conversation, and by the just Manner in which they express
their Thoughts of the pernicious Consequences of the one, and the
happy Effects of the other.
S. Is it the Knowledge of all the Terms
and Expressions proper to be used in Discoursing well upon the
Subject of making a good Shoe, that constitutes a Shoemaker; or is
it the Knowing how to go about it and do it?
C. I own it is the latter, and not the
former.
S. And if one who could only talk
finely about Shoemaking, were to be set to work, would he not
presently discover his Ignorance in that Art?
C. He would, I confess.
S. Can the Man who is only able to talk
justly of Virtue and Vice, and to say that “Drunkenness, Gluttony
and Lewdness destroy a Man’s Constitution; waste his Time and
Substance, and bring him under many Misfortunes, (to the
Destruction of his Happiness) which the contrary Virtues would
enable him to avoid;” but notwithstanding his talking thus,
continues in those Vices; can such a Man deserve the Character of a
Temperate and Chaste Man? Or does not that Man rather deserve it,
who having a thorough Sense that what the other has
said is true, knows also how to resist the Temptation
to those Vices, and embrace Virtue with a hearty and steady
Affection?
C. The latter, I acknowledge. And since
Virtue is really the true Interest of all Men; and some of those
who talk well of it, do not put it in Practice, I am now inclined
to believe they speak only by rote, retailing to us what they have
pick’d out of the Books or Conversation of wise and virtuous Men;
but what having never enter’d or made any Impression on their
Hearts, has therefore no Influence on the Conduct of their
Lives.
S. Vicious Men, then, do not appear to
have that Knowledge which constitutes the Man of Sense.
C. No, I am convinced they do not
deserve the Name. However, I am afraid, that instead of
defining a Man of Sense we have now entirely
annihilated him: For if the Knowledge of his true Interest
in all Parts of the Conduct of Life, and a constant Course of
Practice agreeable to it, are essential to his Character, I do not
know where we shall find him.
S. There seems no necessity that to be a
Man of Sense, he should never make a Slip in the Path of Virtue, or
in Point of Morality; provided he is sensible of his Failing and
diligently applys himself to rectify what is done amiss, and to
prevent the like for the future. The best Arithmetician may err in
casting up a long Account; but having found that Error, he knows
how to mend it, and immediately does so; and is notwithstanding
that Error, an Arithmetician; But he who always blunders,
and cannot correct his Faults in Accounting, is no Arithmetician;
nor is the habitually-vicious Man a Man of Sense.
C. But methinks ’twill look hard, that
all other Arts and Sciences put together, and possess’d by one Man
in the greatest Perfection, are not able to dignify him with the
Title of a Man of Sense, unless he be also a Man of
Virtue.
S. We shall agree, perhaps, that one who
is a Man of Sense, will not spend his Time in Learning such
Sciences as, if not useless in themselves, will probably be useless
to him?
C. I grant it.
S. And of those which may be useful to
him, that is, may contribute to his Happiness, he ought, if he is a
Man of Sense to know how to make them so.
C. To be sure.
S. And of those which may be useful, he
will not (if he is a Man of Sense) acquire all, except that One
only which is the most useful of all, to wit, the Science of
Virtue.
C. It would, I own, be inconsistent with
his Character to do so.
S. It seems to follow then, that the
vicious Man, tho’ Master of many Sciences, must needs be an
ignorant and foolish Man; for being, as he is vicious, of
consequence unhappy, either he has acquired only the useless
Sciences, or having acquired such as might be useful, he knows not
how to make them contribute to his Happiness; and tho’ he may have
every other Science, he is ignorant that the Science of Virtue is of more worth, and of more
consequence to his Happiness than all the rest put together. And
since he is ignorant of what principally concerns him, tho’
it has been told him a thousand Times from Parents, Press, and
Pulpit, the Vicious Man however learned, cannot be a Man of
Sense, but is a Fool, a Dunce, and a Blockhead.