It seems to be the present determination of France, and by some it has been tho’t a wise one, to avoid for a time all open interference in the present contest between Great Britain and the Anglo American Colonys; from a presumption that the former will eventually so far exhaust herself as to give France an opportunity of more Advantageously beginning a War at a later Period. This system of Policy is however too refined and dangerous to be any longer pursued by a wise and provident Administration. It is founded upon two suppositions, which are both, not only doubtfull but fallacious. The 1st is that G Britain will in fact soon become considerably weaker, and less able to resist the attempts of a foreign Enemy than She is at present, if left unattacked. This however is not true. She will indeed so long as the war with America continues, every Year add to her National debts, but so long as she can borrow mony at pleasure, which she will do as long as she is left at Peace in Europe, this addition to her debt, will produce no immediate perceptible debility. On the contrary the sums borrowed, will be expended as they have been some time, in augmenting, repairing and Compleatly Manning her Navy, and in improving and increasing her Army. And both Her Land and Sea forces, by constant actual service, will every day become more brave, expert, Hardy and formidable; whilst those of France, tho’ supported at an Expence nearly as great, are languishing in unprofitable Idleness. In this manner England has become much more Powerful than She was last Year, notwithstanding the addition since made to Her National Debt; And in the same manner She was infinitely more Formidable at the close of the last war, than at the beginning of it, notwithstanding the encrease of Her debt more than 50 Million. The 2d supposition is that the War between Great Britain and the United American Colonys will certainly continue for a Considerable time longer without any interference, openly, on the part of France. But this supposition is even more falacious than the former. The British Govt. have every thing to loose and nothing to gain by continuing the War after the present Campaign; they will therefore doubtless make it their great and last Effort to recover the Dominion of America and terminate the war. They probably hope that a few Victories may be obtained by the Chance of war, and that those on one hand, and the wants and distresses of the Colonys on the other, may induce them to return again to a dependance more or less limited on G. Britain. They must be sensible that if America is ever to be Conquered by them, it must be in the present year; That if it be impossible to do it in the first years of the dispute, it will be madness to expect more success afterwards, when the difficultys of their former situation are removed; when their New Independant Governments have acquired stability, and when the People are become, as they soon will be, well armed, disciplined, and supplyed with all the means of resistance. The British Ministry must therefore be sensible, that a further continuation of hostilities against the Colonys after this year, can only tend to invite or prolong the danger of an additional war in Europe; and they therefore doubtless intend after having tryed the success of this Campaign, however it may end, to make peace on the best terms which can be obtained: and if they cannot recover the Colonys to their wishes, to admit their Claim of Independancy and secure them by a Foederal Alliance. That this is really the intention of the British Ministry seems to have been discoverable, by the late debate in the House of Peers upon Lord Chathams motion, and it is confirmed by reason as well as by private intelligence. There seems therefore no means left for France to prevent the Colonys from being shortly reconciled to G Britain either as Subjects or Allies, but to enter immediately into such Engagements with them, as will necessarily preclude all others; such as will bind and permanently secure their Commerce and Friendship, and enable them as well to repel the Attacks, as to spurn the offers of their present Enemy. It must be rememberd that the first resistance of the Colonys was not to obtain Independancy, but a redress of their Grievances, and that there are many among them, who might even now be sattisfied with a limited subjection to the British Crown. A Majority have indeed put in for the Prize of Independancy, but they have done it partly on a Confidence that France attentive to her most important interests, would soon give them open and effectual aid and Support; but when they find themselves disappointed, when they see some of the powers of Europe Let their Troops to assist in their subjugation, another Power proscribing their Commerce, and the rest looking on as Indifferent Spectators, it is very probable, that despairing of Foreign aid, and severely Pressed by their Enemies, and their own internal wants and distresses, they may be inclined to accept of such terms, as it will be the Interest and disposition of the British Government to grant them. Lord G. Germain, but a few weeks since, declared in the House of Commons that his Hope of ending the American War this year, was principally founded on the disappointment, which the Colonists would feel, when they discover that no assistance is likely to be given them by France. And the British Adherents in America will spare no pains to spread and increase that disappointment by discouraging representations. They already intimate that France equally Hostile to both Parties, foment the Present War, only to make them mutual instruments of each others destruction. Should G Britain by these and other means, detach the Colonys, and reunite them to Herself, France, will irrevocably loose the most favorable opportunity ever afforded to any Nation of Humbling a Powerfull, arrogant and Hereditary Enemy. An opportunity which no Human Wisdom would have produced, and which the most Zealous of Her Patriots could scarcely have Hoped for in our days. Quod nemo divum promittere auderet, en tempus attulit ultro. But it is not simply the opportunity of reducing G Britain, which France will loose, by Her Present inactivity: For Her own Safety and that of all Her American Possessions, will be endangered the moment a reconciliation takes place between Britain and America. The King and Ministry of G Britain already know that France has encouraged and assisted the Colonys in their Present resistance, and they are already as much incensed against Her, as they could be, were She openly to declare War. In truth France has done too much, unless She intends to do more. Without giving the Colonys effectual assistance, it would have been better to leave them wholly unassisted. The British Nation, naturally inimical to the French, pants after Peace with America, that She may turn Her Arms against this Kingdom, and at once gratify Her revenge and Her averice. This is now the General Language of the People and of the leaders of the opposition in England. Even the temperate Lord Camden, but a few days since concluded a long and much applauded Speech in the House of Peers, by fervenly wishing for a Peace with America, and a War with all the world. The Ministry indeed from Prudential Considerations, have for the Present avoided such open declarations of their wishes and intentions, but one who reflects upon the preceeding Observations, cannot doubt but that whenever Peace with America is obtained, by G Britain, whatever may be the Conditions of it, Her whole force on the Continent of America, will be suddenly transported to the W. Indias, and imployed in subduing the French Sugar Islands there, to recompence Her Losses and Expences in this War, and to revenge the secret encouragement and assistance which France is supposed to have given the Colonys against Great Britain.